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Z
I. Introduction
"We have the water rights. We weren't al-

lowed to use them. So they took our private
property away."

The Property Right in Water
By Brian E. Gray&

-Mike Byrne, a Tulelake farmer and
plaintiff in Klamath Irrigation District
v. United States, No. 01-591 L
(Fed. Cl. 2001).'
"A lot of the subsidized farming in the Klamath Basin can be replaced. These endangered species cannot."

-Wendell Wood, Southern Oregon
Field Representative for the Oregon
2
Natural Resources Council.
The debate over takings and water rights
suffers from bipolar disorder. Consumptive
water users-some of whom have relied for
generations on the West's developed water
resources-believe that their rights are vested
and inviolable. Environmentalists-who have
successfully argued that many of our river
systems have been overdeveloped to the detriment of fish, wildlife, and water quality-deny that these users have any property
s Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. B.A., Pomona College, 1976; J.D.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1979.
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues: John
Leshy, for his helpful comments on this paper, and Joe Sax,
Hap Dunning, and Buzz Thompson for their earlier analyses
of many of the issues addressed in this article. See, e.g.,
Joseph L. Sax, "The Constitution, Property Rights and the
Future of Water Law," 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257 (1990);
Harrison C. Dunning, "The Public Right to Use Water in
Place," 4 Waters and Water Rights, Part VI (1996 ed.); Barton
H. Thompson, Jr., "Judicial Takings," 76 U. Va. L. Rev. 1449
(1990). As with all aspects of water resources law, I have
been enriched by their insights.
I. Jeff Barnard, "Klamath Farmers File New Suit Over
Water," Associated Press, Oct. 12, 2001 (reporting the filing of
a $1 billion takings claim against the United States arising
out of the Bureau of Reclamation's reduction in water service to irrigation districts and farmers in the Klamath Basin
to provide water for three species of fish protected by the
Endangered Species Act).
2. Eric Bailey, "Farmers Seek U.S. Help to Regain
Water Diverted to Protect Fish," L.A. Times, July 4, 2001, § 2.
p. 8 (reporting the filing of an application to convene an
"Endangered Species Committee"-i.e., God Squad-to review the biological opinions for the Klamath Project that
resulted in the elimination of water service to more than
200,000 acres of farmland in the basin).
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or contract rights to divert water under circumstances that harm environmental interests.
These opposing views of water rights illustrate a fundamental tension in water rights
law. On the one hand, water rights are recognized as property under both state and federal law, and the holders and beneficiaries of
these rights have legitimate reliance interests
in the continued supply of water. In the Klamath Basin, for example, some users (or their
predecessors) have been farming for more
than 100 years. 3 As one Tulelake resident has
put it, "My grandfather homesteaded in 1939
and was given the promise that water would
be there to irrigate his farm. The devastation
'4
for our family and friends is unbelievable."
On the other hand, water rights are a unique
form of property-limited by hydrologic variability, competing demands, the doctrines of
reasonable and beneficial use, and in some
states overtly environmental laws such as the
public trust and statutory directives to protect instream flows and water quality. Moreover, in those situations where water is
supplied by contract (such as in the Klamath
Project and other components of the federal
reclamation system), the terms and conditions of water service set forth in those contracts also may limit the water users' property
rights. The first question in all water rights
takings cases therefore is: Does the plaintiff
in fact possess water rights (or contract rights
to water service) that allegedly have been impaired by government action or regulation?
If. Private Property and Takings
"The just compensation clause requires compensation for the taking of property, which
is to say the taking of a thing, tangible or
intangible, recognized by law as property."
3. William Kittredge, Balancing Water: Restoring the Klamath Basin 52-57 (2000). The Klamath Project, one of the
oldest in the federal reclamation system, was authorized by
Congress in 1905. Water deliveries began in 1910. Id.
4. Peter Hecht, "Scientific Review of Klamath Irrigation Shutoff Begins," Sacramento Bee, Nov. 1I,2001 (quoting
Bill Heiney, who was able to irrigate only eight percent of
his normal planting of mint, alfalfa, potatoes, and sugar
beets on his 500 acre farm).

-Eric

T. Freyfogle, "Regulatory
Takings, Methodically,"
31 Environmental Law Reporter
10313 (2001).

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution sets forth the elements of takings claims
in grammatical sequence: "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just
compensation."5 As the text indicates, before
property may be "taken," there must exist
"private property" capable of being
taken.
The Supreme Court has made clear in several
important decisions that the plaintiff in takings cases must establish that he or she possesses property rights vis-4I-vis the
government, which the government has taken
either by eminent domain or by regulation. If
the plaintiff cannot prove such a property
right, the takings claim fails ab initio.
Two cases involving the federal navigational servitude are illustrative. In United
States v. Rands,6 the plaintiffs owned land
along the Columbia River near the confluence
with the John Day. They leased the land to
Oregon with an option to purchase. The state
planned to use the property as an industrial
site and port. If Oregon exercised this option,
however, it would have had to pay market
value for the land in the John Day Lock and
Dam Project. Instead, the United States then
condemned the Rands' land as part of the
John Day Lock and Dam Project and subsequently transferred fee title to the state "at a
price considerably less than the option price
at which respondents had hoped to sell."7 In
the condemnation case, the Government asserted the federal navigational servitude and
argued that all value in the land attributable
to its proximity to the Columbia River must
be excluded from the determination of "just
compensation." The district court agreed and
decided that the compensable value of the
5. U.S. Constitution, Amendment V. The takings
clause is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S.
Ct. 1465, 1470 n.1 (2002).
6. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
7. Id. at 122.
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property should be "limited to its value for
sand, gravel, and agricultural purposes and
that its special value as a port site could not
be considered. The ultimate award was about
one-fifth the claimed value of the land if used
as a port." 8
In upholding the district court's application of the federal navigational servitude, the
Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs
did not have property rights vis-a-vis the
United States in any aspect of their property
subject to the servitude. These included the
flow of the water in the Columbia River, the
submerged lands below the median high
water mark, access to the water, and other
values attributable to the property's proximity to the river. According to the Court, "these
rights and values are not assertable against
the superior rights of the United States, are
not property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, and need not be paid for when
appropriated by the United States." 9
United States v. Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma' ° applied the principles of Rands to
an alleged regulatory taking. The Cherokee
Nation, which held fee title to the bed and
banks of the Arkansas River, sued the United
States for just compensation for damage to
its interests caused by the Army Corps of Engineers' construction of navigational improvements in the river. The Tribe claimed
that the treaty that conveyed fee title to the
riverbed also abrogated the federal navigational servitude, The Supreme Court held
that the servitude may be waived only by express and unmistakable language in the
treaty. Because the treaty was silent on the
question, the United States retained its paramount authority under the federal navigational servitude. As in Rands, the Court
concluded, "the tribal interests at issue here
simply do not include the right to be free
8. Id.
9. Id.at 126.
10. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
11.Id. at 708 (quoting Rands, 389 U.S. at 123).
12. 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001).
13. Tulare Lake will be the focus of part III
of this arti-

from the navigational servitude, for exercise
of the servitude is 'not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands
underlying it." 1 '
The principle that a takings claimant
must first establish the existence of a property right against the government is frequently overlooked, or misunderstood, both
by courts and litigants. Indeed, in the two
most prominent pending takings cases involving water and contract rights, the distinction between property rights and takings has
been inappropriately blurred. In Tulare Lake
Water Storage District v. United States, 12 the Court
of Federal Claims decided that a reduction in
water service to several California State Water
Project contractors-which was caused by a
combination of drought and the application
of the Endangered Species Act-was a taking
of the contractors' property. The court
reached this conclusion, however, before it
determined either that the plaintiffs' SWP
contacts gave them the right to water service
under these conditions of shortage or that
the United States' implementation of the Endangered Species Act violated the underlying
water rights for the project. 13 Similarly, the
plaintiffs in the Klamath Basin takings case,
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States,14 have
alleged that the reduction in water service
from the Klamath Project, also caused by
drought and endangered species obligations,
was a taking of their water rights without just
compensation. The complaint ignores the
fact that the plaintiffs' rights to water service
from the project are defined by the contracts
by which the Bureau of Reclamation delivers
water to them. For takings purposes,
whatever water rights the plaintiffs may possess have been superceded by the terms and
conditions set forth in those water contracts. '5
14. Court of Federal Claims, No. 01-591 L (complaint
filed, Oct. 11, 2001).
15. The Klamath takings litigation will be a focus of
part IV.
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If the first question in any takings case
then is whether the plaintiffs actually own
"property" vis-a-vis the government, the more
intriguing next question arises: What exactly
is the property right in water? The answer is
layered and in some cases elusive. A water
user's rights may be found in contracts, permits and licenses, administrative orders, statutes, state constitutions, judicial opinions,
common law doctrines, and combinations
thereof.
IlI. Water Rights and Takings.
"While plaintiffs correctly argue that a property right cannot be taken or damaged without just compensation, they ignore the
necessity of first establishing the legal existence of a compensable property interest.
Such an interest consists in their right to the
reasonable use of the flow of the water ....
There is now no provision of law which authorizes an unreasonable use or endows such use
with the quality of a legally protectible interest merely because it may be fortuitously
beneficial to the lands involved."
-Justice Raymond Sullivan, writing
for a unanimous court California
Supreme Court in Joslin v.
Marin Municipal Water District,
67 Cal.2d 132, 143-44 (1967).
Water rights are a unique form of property, because the property right in water is
limited (or rendered less certain) by a variety
of factors that seldom affect real property and
other property rights. These limitations are
both physical and legal. They include:
* the common nature of the resource (which
is shared not only by water right holders
and other consumptive users, but also by in
situ uses such as fish and wildlife, aquatic
and riparian habitat, water quality, and
other environmental uses);
16. The California Supreme Court explained the link
between hydrologic forces and the unique features of the
water right in Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 368,
40 P.2d 486, 491 (1935): "The waters of our streams are not
like land which is static, can be measured and divided and
the division remain the same. Water is constantly shifting,
and the supply changes to some extent every day. A
stream supply may be divided but the product of the divi-

4
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* hydrologic variability and consequent uncertainties regarding the availability of
water for diversion, storage, and distribution;
" ambiguities in quantification and priority,
as well as inaccuracies in the measurement
of diversion, use, and return flow;
" tensions between privatization of the resource through the water rights system and
declarations of state ownership of all water
resources; and
" express limitations on the property right in
water-such as reasonable and beneficial
use, the federal navigational servitude, and
the public trust-that are designed to protect the common and public interest.
The concept of a "vested" water
right-protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments from takings without payment
of just compensation-is defined by these
physical and legal limitations. 16 As a consequence, both the states and the federal government have broad authority to regulate the
appropriation and use of water-without violating the property rights of water right holders and other water users-to protect fish,
wildlife, water quality, and other aspects of
the natural environment. The most general,
and important of the limitations embodied in
the water right is the doctrine of reasonable
and beneficial use. Application of the doctrine is heavily dependent on the facts of
each case, and the definition of reasonable
and beneficial use varies from state to state.
To understand how the doctrine works as a
potential limitation on the property right in
water, therefore, it is best to look at one
case-the most significant water rights takings
case litigated to date-Tulare Lake Water Storage
7
District v. United States.'
As with the other cases discussed in this
article, Tulare Lake arose out of the application
of the Endangered Species Act to long-standsion in nowise remains the same. When the supply is limited public interest requires that there be the greatest
number of beneficial uses which the supply can yield."
17. 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001). For a detailed analysis of
the Tulare Lake litigation, see Melinda Harm Benson, Tulare
Lake Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth
Amendment, 32 Environmental Law 551 (2002).
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ing water supply arrangements. This is no coincidence, because the Endangered Species
Act presents the starkest contrast between
the ancien rEgime-the era of seemingly limitless water resources development-and our
contemporary world in which consumptive
users must compete both with each other
and with the natural environment for the developed (and, in many cases, overextended)
water resources. As Judge John Paul Wiese
noted at the outset of his opinion in the case,
the decisions made by the National Marine
Fisheries Service and the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service to protect the Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and
the Delta Smelt-"specifically by restricting
water outflows in California's primary water
distribution system-bring together, and arguably into conflict, the Endangered Species
Act and California's century-old regime of pri8
vate water rights."'
The plaintiffs in Tulare Lake are four California water agencies, as well as several water
users within the agencies, that receive water
by contract from the California State Water
Project. 19 The SWP is owned and operated by
the California Department of Water Resources, which also holds the water rights for
the project. Pursuant to a 1985 agreement,
DWR coordinates its operation of the SWP
with the Bureau of Reclamation's operation
of the Central Valley Project. 20 One consequence of the Coordinated Operation Agree18. Id. at 314.
19. Two of these agencies-the Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District and the Kern County Water
Agency-have contracts with the SWP water service. The
others two agencies-Lost Hills Water District and Wheeler
Ridge-Maricopa Water Supply District-have subsidiary contracts with Tulare Lake and KCWA. Id. at 315.
20. Agreement Between the United States of America
and the Department of Water Resources of the State of California for the Coordinated Operation of the Central Valley
Project and the State Water Project (May 20, 1985); see Pub.
L. No. 99-546, 100 Stat. 3050 (1986) (congressional authorization of the "Coordinated Operation Agreement").
21. Section 7 requires federal agencies such as the
Bureau of Reclamation to consult with NMFS or USFWS to
"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by Ithel agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered or threatened species or result in destruction or adverse modification" of the specie's
critical habitat. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2).
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ment is that DWR's ability to supply water to
customers of the SWP is governed by the consultation requirements of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, which without the
agreement would apply only to the Bureau of
Reclamation's operation of the CVP. 2 1 At the
time the litigation arose, two species of fish
that inhabit the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River and Delta water system-the Winter Run
Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt-had
22
been listed for protection under the Act.
The biological opinions for the coordinated
operation of the two projects for water years
1992-1994 gave rise to the plaintiffs' takings
2 3
claims against the United States.
The reasonable and prudent alternatives
set forth in the biological opinions led to significant changes in both CVP and SWP operations, including restrictions on pumping to
protect in-migrating adult salmon and outmigrating juveniles, the routing of additional
flows from the Sacramento River away from
the interior channels of the Delta into the
Carquinez Strait and San Francisco Bay, and
compliance with temperature and salinity
standards to protect both species of fish during their respective spawning seasons.
Among the immediate consequences of these
changes were shortages in both the CVP and
SWP systems. Most CVP agricultural contractors located south of the Delta received only
about half of their stated contract supplies in
1993,24 and SWP contractors incurred signifi22. NMFS listed the Winter-Run Chinook Salmon as a
threatened species in 1989, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,191 (Apr. 2.
1989), and as an endangered species in 1994. 59 Fed. Reg.
440 (lan. 4, 1994). USFWS listed the Delta Smelt as a
threatened species in 1993. 58 Fed. Reg. 12,863 (Mar. 5,
1993). In 1999, the agencies listed two other species that
inhabit or pass through the Delta as threatened: the Sacramento Splittail, 64 Fed. Reg. 5963 (Feb. 8, 1999); and the
Sacramento River Spring-Run Chinook Salmon. 64 Fed.
Reg. 50394 (Sept. 16, 1999).
23. NMFS issued biological opinions on the effects of
joint project operations on the Winter-Run Salmon for all
three water years in question. Because of the later listing
of the Delta Smelt, USFWS issued biological opinions only
for water years 1993 and 1994. See Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. CI. at
315-16.
24. The litigation over the CVP water service deficiencies is analyzed in Part IV.
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cant shortages as well. Tulare Lake alleged
that the restrictions on project operations set
forth in the biological opinions deprived its
users of 58,820 acre feet during water years
1992-1994. KCWA claimed that DWR's compliance with the biological opinions cost its
users 319,420 acre feet over the same period. 25 Although these shortages were partly
the result of prolonged drought-water years
1987 through 1992 were either dry or critically
dry years-there also is no question but that
the Endangered Species Act contributed to
the water supply deficiencies by mandating
the reallocation of water from consumptive
uses in the CVP and SWP systems to the in
situ needs of the two protected species of fish.
The water shortages at issue in Tulare Lake
thus resulted from a hybrid drought-a
drought caused by both hydrologic and regulatory forces.
The Court of Federal Claims has concluded that the United States is legally responsible for these water shortages and must
pay the Tulare Lake plaintiffs just compensa25. See 49 Fed. Cl. at 316. Tulare Lake's SWP normal
allocation is 118,500 afa, while KCWA's contract allotment
is 1,153,400 afa. Id. at 315. All of the SWP contracts provide, however, that "Inleither the state nor any of its officers, agents, or employees shall be liable for any damage,
direct or indirect, arising from shortages . . caused by
drought, operation of area of origin statutes, or any other
cause beyond Itheirl control." California State Water Project Contracts I 18(f); see 49 Fed. Cl. at 320.
26. At this writing, the United States has decided not
to seek an interlocutory appeal, and the parties are preparing to present evidence on damages.
27. The United States argued that the Act rendered
full performance of the SWP contracts illegal and thus simply frustrated the contractors' expectations- Accordingly,
the Government neither appropriated the contracts themselves, nor engaged in a taking of the underlying right to
full water service. See 49 Fed. CI. at 317.
28. Id. at 318. The California State Water Resources
Control Board has amended the water rights permits for
the SWP (and the CVP) inter alia to require project operators
to protect all endangered and threatened species in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Delta system. California State Water Resources Control Board, Water Right Order 95-1 (1995); see California State Water Resources
Control Board, Water Quality Control Plan for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary (1995);
California State Water Resources Control Board, Water
Right Order 95-6 (1995); California State Water Resources
Control Board, Water Right Order 98-9 (1998); California
State Water Resources Control Board, Water Right Decision
1641 (1999).

tion for taking their property. 26 Judge Wiese
based his decision on three grounds.
First, he held that the application of the
Endangered Species Act to reduce the plaintiffs' water supplies did more than simply
frustrate the performance of their State Water
Project contracts. 27 Rather, "ItIhose contracts
confer on plaintiffs a right to the exclusive
use of prescribed quantities of water, consistent with the terms of Ithe SWP] permits.
That right remains in place until formally
changed by administrative process." 28 Because the reasonable and prudent alternatives imposed on the project by NMFS and
USFWS deprived the plaintiffs of this right of
use, the court concluded, the Government en29
gaged in a taking of their property.
Second, Judge Wiese ruled that the reduction in the plaintiffs' SWP water deliveries
was a per se taking under the permanent physical occupation rule of Loretto v. ManhattanTeleprompter CATV Corp.30 The court analogized
29. Judge Wiese rejected the United States' reliance
on Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502
(1923), in which the Supreme Court held that the Government did not take Omnia's property when it requisitioned
Allegheny Steel Company's entire production of steel plate
during World War I. Omnia had a contract with Allegheny
to purchase large quantities of steel plate at below-market
price and claimed that the United States' preemption of
this contract violated its Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court held that the Government did not take
Omnia's property, because the takings clause "has always
been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the
exercise of lawful power." Id. at 510 (citation omitted). In
Tulare Lake, Judge Wiese distinguished Omnia on the ground
that the plaintiffs' SWP contract rights to water were more
"matured." "Unlike the situation in Omnia, where the
plaintiff could claim only a contract expectancy but not an ownership right in the steel, our plaintiffs can claim an
identifiable interest in a stipulated volume of water." 49
Fed. Cl. at 318.
The court's contract analysis is questionable. For
what is an executory contract right if not an "ownership
right" in the steel, water, or other good or service the contractor has been promised? More relevant to this article,
however, is the antecedent conclusion that the SWP contractors have "an identifiable interest in a stipulated volume
of water." As explained in the text that follows, this definition of the property right in water is incorrect under California water rights law.
30. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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the case to United States v. Causby,3 1 in which
the Supreme Court held that the Government
was liable for the invasion of airspace immediately above the plaintiffs' land by military
planes taking off and landing at a nearby airfield. Judge Wiese also relied heavily on
three other cases in which the Supreme Court
suggested that the construction and operation of the CVP (and consequent interference
with downstream water rights) was tantamount to an invasion of land and therefore
32
was a taking of property.
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limitations on the water rights for the
SWP-and, hence, the plaintiffs' derivative
rights as project contractors-came into play.
The "plaintiffs' contract rights are subject to
the public trust doctrine, the doctrine of reasonable use, and common law principles of
nuisance, all of which provide for the protection of fish and wildlife. To the extent that
the reductions in the water supply that plaintiffs suffered are designed to advance those
interests .... the reductions merely reflect the
limitations of title inherent in the background
principles of state law, land] no right to compensation attends the assertion of such back34
ground principles."

Third, "[hlaving concluded that a deprivation of water amounts to a physical taking"-not to mention an abridgement of
contract rights-Judge Wiese then turned "to
the question of whether plaintiffs in fact
owned the property for which they seek to be
compensated." 33 As noted at the outset, the
court's analysis of this question as something
of an afterthought is backward, because there
can never be a taking of property or breach of
contract unless the plaintiffs in fact possess
the property or contract rights that form the
basis of their claim for just compensation.

Judge Wiese rejected the Government's
characterization of the plaintiffs' property
rights in the water supplied by the SWP. He
based his decision on the water rights permits for the project, which were modified by
the California State Water Resources Control
Board in a 1978 decision that is commonly

The United States argued that the plaintiffs simply did not have rights to water service under the conditions that gave rise to the
litigation: prolonged drought; water
shortages among consumptive users; competition between consumptive users and instream uses over available supplies; and valid
regulatory judgments made by NMFS and
USFWS that the projects could not fully exercise their appropriative rights without jeopardizing the Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and
the Delta Smelt. Under these circumstances,
the Government contended, fundamental

Iiln the Plan, the Board set new water
quality standards to protect fish and
wildlife and to protect agricultural, industrial and municipal uses of Delta
waters. In the Decision, the Board
modified the permits held by the U.S.
Bureau and the DWR to compel the
projects to release enough water into
the Delta or to reduce their exports
from the Delta so as to maintain the

31. 328 U.S. 256 (1945).
32. 49 Fed. CI. at 319. Judge Wiese cited United
States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), and
Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275
(1958), and quoted the Court's declaration in Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963), that a "seizure of water
rights need not necessarily be a physical invasion of land.
It may occur upstream, as here." He rejected the United
States' attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground
that "each involved actual diversions of water by the government for its own consumptive use, whereas here, it is
claimed, the government has merely regulated the plaintiffs' method of diverting water." Id.Judge Wiese did not

known as Decision 1485 or simply "D-1485.

35

The Board adopted Decision 1485 concurrently with its promulgation of ambient water
quality standards for the Delta. 36 As the California Court of Appeal has explained,

explain why he believed this factual distinction was of no
consequence.
33. Id. at 320.
34. 49 Fed. CI. at 320.
35. California State Water Resources Control Board,
Water Right Decision 1485: Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
and Suisun Marsh (1978).
36. California State Water Resources Control Board,
Water Quality Control Plan: Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
and Suisun Marsh (1978).
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water 7 quality standards set in the
Plan.1

According to Judge Wiese, because the Water
Quality Control Plan and Decision 1485 focused inter alia on fish and allocated the available water to the SWP (and the CVP) based
on the water requirements of the fish and
other in situ uses, the diversion rights set
forth in D-1485 define the Department of
Water Resources' (and its contractors') water
rights:
Once an allocation has been made-as
was done in D-1485-that determination defines the scope of plaintiffs'
property rights, pronouncements of
other agencies notwithstanding.
While we accept the principle that
California water policy may be everevolving, rights based on contracts
with the state are not correspondingly
self-adjusting. Rather, the promissory
assurances they recite remain fixed
until formally changed. In the absence of a reallocation by the State
Water Resources Control Board, or a
determination of illegality by the California courts, the allocation scheme
imposed by D-1485 defines the scope
38
of plaintiffs' contract rights.

Judge Wiese acknowledged that all California water rights are subject to the requirement of reasonable use, the public trust
doctrine, and principles of nuisance law, but
he rejected the United States' argument that
the plaintiffs' rights to water service were limited by these rules during the three water
years at issue. Were it not for the restrictions
imposed by the biological opinions, he
37. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 111, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 175
(1986).
38. 49 Fed. Cl. at 322.
39. Id. at 323.
40. Id. at 322.
41. id. at 323-24.
42. Id. at 324. Judge Wiese also decided that the
shortage provision in the SWP contracts protected only the
State from liability for water supply deficiencies "caused by
drought, operation of area of origin statutes, or any other
cause beyond its control." California State Water Project
Contracts I 18(f); see supra note 26. According to the court,

noted, Decision 1485 allocated sufficient
water to DWR to enable it to provide full
water deliveries to its contractors. The delivery of project water to the plaintiffs therefore
could not be termed a nuisance under existing principles of California law, because
that allocation "was specifically authorized by
the state in D-1485." 39 Although the SWRCB
subsequently declared these project operations to be illegal to the extent they were inconsistent with the reasonable and prudent
alternatives established by NMFS and
USFWS, Judge Wiese observed that this modification of the SWP water rights permits occurred in 1995-"after the period in dispute,
and cannot therefore be construed as altering
the scope of plaintiffs' contract rights for the
40
1992-1994 period.."
Nor would the court accept the Government's invitation to consider whether full
water service to the plaintiffs-under conditions that the fisheries services believed
would be likely to harm the Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt-would
have violated the reasonable use doctrine
and the public trust. These laws "require a
complex balancing of interests," Judge Wiese
explained, and call for "an exercise of discretion for which this court is not suited and
with which it is not charged." 4' He concluded
that "lilt is the Board that must provide the
necessary weighing of interests to determine
the appropriate balance under California law
between the cost and benefit of species preservation. The federal government is certainly
free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay

for the water it takes to do

so."42

this contract term "insulates DWR from liability for circumstances beyond its control; not the federal government." 49
Fed. Cl. at 321 (emphasis in original). Nor does it "render
plaintiffs' interest in the water contingent; it merely provides DWR with a defense against a breach of contract action in certain specified circumstances. With that
exception, plaintiffs' contract rights are otherwise fully
formed against DWR, and certainly against a third party
[viz. the United States] seeking to infringe on those rights."
Id.
This aspect of the court's analysis is correct. The exemption from liability set forth in the shortage provision of
the contracts expressly applies only to the State and its
officers, agents, and employees, and the court properly re-
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Reluctant to delve into the nuances of
the reasonable use and public trust doctrines, the Court of Federal Claims seized on
Decision 1485 as the conclusive definition of
the water rights for the State Water Project
and hence the plaintiffs' derivative rights to
water service from the project. In essence,
the court decided that an appropriator is legally entitled to engage in (and has property
rights to) any conduct that is authorized by
its water rights permit or license. 4 3 This in-

terpretation oversimplifies-and
misapprehends-the nature of
water rights.

therefore
California

The California Constitution declares that
Itlhe right to water or to the use or
flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this State is
and shall be limited to such water as
shall be reasonably required for the
beneficial use to be served, and such
right does not and shall not extend to
the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of
44
water.
fused to find a broader implied immunity that would include the federal government. The provision may well, as
the United States argued, be evidence that the plaintiffs
knew (or reasonably should have known) that their annual
water deliveries would be uncertain, variable, and subject
to a variety of hydrologic and legal contingencies. But that
evidence would only be relevant to the question whether
the reductions in water service as required by the biological opinions constituted a taking. Specifically, the Government might be able to use the shortage provision to argue
that the plaintiffs could not have formed reasonable, investment-backed expectations that they would receive full
water deliveries throughout the term of the SWP contracts
unaffected by the enactment and implementation of new
laws such as the Endangered Species Act. See, e.g., Good v.
United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This argument would not be relevant, however, to the antecedent
question on which the court was finally focused: In this
context, did the plaintiffs have the right to full water service notwithstanding the conflicting demands of the Endangered Species Act?
43. The most cogent articulation of this interpretation
comes at the conclusion of the court's opinion: "There is, in
the end, no dispute that DWR's permits, and in turn plaintiffs' contract rights, are subject to the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust and to the tenets of state
nuisance law. Nor is there serious challenge to the premise that the SWRCB, under its reserved jurisdiction, could
at any time modify the terms of those permits to reflect the
changing need of the various water users. The crucial
point, however, is that it had not." 49 Fed. CI. at 324.

The doctrine of reasonable use applies to all
uses of water, including water appropriated
45
and distributed by the State Water Project.
Whether a specific use of water under particular circumstances is reasonable depends on
the facts of each case. 46 Moreover, the defini-

tion of reasonable use is a dynamic and utilitarian concept. As the California Supreme
Court has stated: "What constitutes reasonable water use is dependent upon not only the
entire circumstances presented but varies as
the current situation changes ....
'IRleasonable use of water depends on the
circumstances of each case, [and] such an inquiry cannot be resolved in vacuo from statewide considerations of transcendent
47
importance.' ,

The California courts have applied the
doctrine of reasonable use to overturn longstanding priorities of water rights, 4 8 and they

have held that consumptive uses of water
based on appropriative rights may become
unreasonable because of the adverse effects
of the diversion or use on the natural environment. 49 Indeed, in its review of the 1978
44. California Constitution, art. X, § 2 (West 1996).
45. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187
(1986).
46. Id.at 130 n.24, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187 n.24.
47. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal.3d 183, 194, 605 P.2d I, 6, 161
Cal. Rptr. 466, 471 (1980) (quoting Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, 67 Cal.2d 132, 140, 429 P.2d 889, 894, 60
Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (1967)).
48. See, e.g., Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,
67 Cal.2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967) (new
appropriative right granted priority over riparian right);
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351,40 P.2d 486 (1935)
(same); Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673,
22 P.2d 5 (1933) (same); Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch
Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971) (senior
appropriative use wasteful and unreasonable in light of
new competing appropriation).
49. See, e.g., National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983)
(effects of Los Angeles' exercise of licensed appropriative
rights on the Mono Lake ecosystem); Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal.3d
183, 605 P.2d 1,161 Cal. Rptr. 466, (1980) (potential harm
to instream uses of the American River by proposed new
appropriation); Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water
Resources Control Board, 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 250 (1990) (exercise of pre-1914 appropriative rights
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Water Quality Control Plan and Decision
1485, the court of appeal emphasized that the
Department of Water Resources' rights to appropriate water for distribution to SWP contractors are dependent on the effects of
project operations on the beneficial uses (including fish) protected by the water quality
standards. In rejecting SWP and CVP contractors' challenges to the SWRCB's authority to
alter the projects' water rights, the court explained that the board had "determined that
changed circumstances revealed in new information about the adverse effects of the
projects upon the Delta necessitated revised
water quality standards. Accordingly, the
Board had the authority to modify the
projects' permits to curtail their use of water
on the ground that the projects' use and diversion of the water had become unreasonable."50 Although the court referred to the
board's power to alter water rights based on a
finding of unreasonable use, the California
Constitution expressly provides that the rea'5
sonable use requirement is "self-executing," '
and the California Supreme Court has held
that reasonable use is an inherent limitation
on all water rights (whether they are subject
52
to the board's direct jurisdiction or not).
The Court of Federal Claims' failure to
address the question whether the provision
of full water deliveries to the plaintiffs-under
circumstances that in the judgment of NMFS
and USFWS would jeopardize the existence of
the Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and the
Delta Smelt-would have been unreasonable
is contrary to California water rights law. Furthermore, it also represents an abdication of
the court's responsibility to determine
whether the plaintiffs in fact possessed property rights that were capable of being taken
is unreasonable because of flooding caused by wasteful delivery and irrigation practices).
50. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
51. The last sentence of article X, section 2 declares:
"This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature
may also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this
section contained." California Constitution, art. X, § 2
(West 1996).
52. Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal.3d 183, 198-200, 605 P.2d 1, 9-10,

without just compensation as a result of the
SWP's compliance with the biological opinions. The DWR's rights to divert water under
its water rights permits for the SWP (and
hence the plaintiffs' derivative contract rights
to water service) depend on DWR's reasonable exercise of it water rights-regardless of
the permit terms set forth in Decision 1485.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court could
not have articulated the link between reasonable use and the property right in water more
clearly than in its conclusion in Joslin v. Marin
Municipal Water District,53 in which the court
unanimously rejected an inverse condemnation claim brought by riparians whose longstanding exercise of their water rights had
been destroyed by the construction of an upstream dam: As a result of the new appropriation for domestic water supply, the plaintiffs'
continuing exercise of their riparian rights
had become unreasonable. "ISlince there
was and is no property right in an unreasonable use, there has been no taking or damaging of property by the deprivation of such use
and, accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable."54

The Court of Federal Claims also erred in
failing to consider whether the provision of
full water service to the plaintiffs would have
violated the public trust. In its landmark decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court,55 the California Supreme Court held

that the public trust doctrine is an integral
part of the water rights system and "imposes
a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water." The
court's decision to merge the two legal systems paralleled its articulation of the reasonable use doctrine in three respects. First, the
court stated that, along with the principle of
161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 475-76 (1980); Joslin v. Marin Municipal
Water District, 67 Cal.2d 132, 137-39, 429 P.2d 889, 893-94,
60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381-82 (1967); Imperial Irrigation District
v. State Water Resources Control Board, 225 Cal. App. 3d
548, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990).
53. Joslin, 67 Cal.2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1967).
54. id. at 145, 429 P.2d at 898, 60 Cal. Rptr. 386.
55. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346

(1983).
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reasonable use, the public trust renders all
water rights contingent on their continuing
exercise in a manner that comports with current public values-in this case protection of
the natural environment. 56 "In exercising its
sovereign power to allocate water resources
in the public interest," the court declared,
"the state is not confined by past allocation
decisions which may be incorrect in light of
current knowledge or inconsistent with current needs. The state accordingly has the
power to reconsider allocation decisions even
though those decisions were made after due
consideration of their effect on the public
trust."5

7

Second, this evolving governmental

authority means that the property right in
water is equally dynamic. The doctrine "prevents any party from acquiring a vested right
to appropriate water in a manner harmful to
' 58
the interests protected by the public trust."

Third, neither the public trust nor the consumptive use of water necessarily takes precedence over the other. Rather, the state has
a continuing obligation to seek an accommodation between the competing interests and
"to preserve, so far as consistent with the
public interest, the uses protected by the
trust."59 To emphasize this point, the court

held that "[aill uses of water, including public
trust uses, must now conform to the standard
' 60
of reasonable use."

As with the doctrine of reasonable use,
protection of the public trust is not dependent on enforcement by the SWRCB. The
courts and the Board have "concurrent original jurisdiction in suits to determine water
rights," and the public trust is an integral
component of such rights. 6 1 In other words,
when a court is asked to evaluate or to construe a water right, it must consider the pub56. Consistent with its earlier description of the public trust, see Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1970), the court held that the doctrine
may be applied to protect brine shrimp in Mono Lake
(which it decided qualified as a "fishery" under the traditional public trust cases), as well as recreational and ecological interests such as "the scenic views of the lake and
its shore, the purity of the air, and the use of the lake for
nesting and feeding by birds." Audubon, 33 Cal. 3d at 435,
658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
57. id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
58. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.

lic trust. 62 If the water right holder cannot

exercise their rights without violating the
public trust, restricting the exercise of the
water right to provide water for public trust
uses cannot be a taking because there exists
no valid water right to be taken. As the California Supreme Court stated at the end of its
opinion in Audubon, the integration of the
public trust doctrine into the water rights system "precludes anyone from acquiring a
63
vested right to harm the public trust."
By declining to consider the effects of
the reasonable use and public trust doctrines
on SWP contractors' rights to full water service under conditions that would be likely to
jeopardize two species of fish protected by
the Endangered Species Act, the Court of
Federal Claims thus abjured its first responsibility in a water rights taking case-to determine whether the plaintiffs in fact have
"property" capable of being taken by the government action at issue. For our purposes,
the exact determination of the plaintiffs'
property rights under California water law is
less important than what the inquiry illustrates: In takings cases based on state-created water rights, the decision whether the
plaintiffs have property rights vis-a-vis the government is a complex, yet unavoidable, inquiry. The questions that the court should
have addressed in Tulare Lake include:
* Was the allocation of water to protect the
Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and the Delta
Smelt set forth in the biological opinions
for the coordination operation of the SWP
and the CVP during water years 1992-1994
reasonable in light of the water available to
the projects during the protracted drought,
the needs of the protected species, and the
59. Id. at 446-47, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
60. Id. at 443, 658 P.2d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
61. Id. at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
62. The court did note that, "lilf the nature or complexity of the issues indicate that an initial determination
by the board is appropriate, the courts may refer the matter
to the board" for assistance in adjudicating the public trust
claims. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
63. Id.
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competing consumptive uses of water supplied by the projects?
" Were the restrictions on pumping and
other changes in project operations directed by the biological opinions reasonable, taking into account the limited water
available in the system, the needs of the
species, the reasonable demands for water
by project contractors, and the contractors'
ability to conserve or to obtain water from
other sources (such as water transfers or
increased groundwater pumping)?
* Were the limitations imposed on water service to SWP contractors reasonably necessary to protect the public trust in the
waters of the Sacramento-San Joaquin
River and Delta system? Did the reasonable demands for water by SWP contractors
outweigh the needs of the two protected
species of fish? Did the allocation of additional water in compliance with the biological opinions "better balance the diverse
interests" than would full water deliveries
under conditions that would have been
likely to jeopardize the existence of the
64
species?
The answers to these questions necessarily subject federal regulatory decisions to judicial review under state law. Yet, this
awkwardness is unavoidable in water rights
takings cases, because state law defines the
property right in water. The Court of Federal
Claims (or any other court that adjudicates
such a takings case) must decide the "reasonableness" of restrictions on state water rights
imposed by NMFS or USFWS only for the purpose of deciding whether the plaintiffs possess water rights to support their takings
claim. The court does not review the reasonableness of the federal regulatory decision on
the merits and of course has no authority to
enjoin or to invalidate that decision in adjudicating the takings claim. Moreover, in determining the reasonableness of the federally
64. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996).
66. Judicial review of agency decisions under section
7 of the Endangered Species Act is authorized by section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 702
(1996). Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston,
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mandated restrictions on the exercise of state
water rights, the Court of Federal Claims
should give deference to the decisions made
by NMFS and USFWS just as a court would
provide in direct review of the agencies' decisions under section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act 65 . For example, the court must

accept the services' opinions that the provision of full water service to SWP contractors
would have jeopardized the existence of the
Winter-Run Chinook Salmon and the Delta
Smelt-and therefore the water supply limitations imposed by the biological opinions
were necessary to protect the species-unless
the court concludes that the reasonable and
prudent alternatives set forth in the biological opinions were not supported by the re66
cord or were arbitrary and capricious.
The unique characteristics of the property right in water thus add layers of complexity to the analysis of water rights takings
cases that go far beyond takings cases involving land or other types of property. In most
takings cases, the existence of the property
right is uncontroversial- the government restricts the use or development of a fee interest in real property (or possessory interest in
personal property) and the litigation quickly
focuses on the question whether the restriction is a taking. By comparison, in water
rights takings cases the plaintiff has the burden of first proving that it had the right to appropriate water (or, as in Tulare Lake, the right
to water service) under the conditions that
gave rise to the government regulation. In
California, at least, the laws that define the
water right-including the reasonable use
doctrine and the public trust-render this aspect of the plaintiff's case far from certain.
Yet, just as the assertion of a water right
does not satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving the existence of "property" capable of being taken by the government regulation in
question, the counter-assertion that the
146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998). "A court may set aside
an agency action under (the APAI if it was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' or if it was found to be 'without observance
of procedure required by law."' Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 706(2)(A) & (D)).
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plaintiff's exercise of its water rights would
have been unreasonable or contrary to the
public trust does not necessarily negate the
takings claim.
First, the decision whether the use of
water restricted by the regulation would have
been unreasonable in light of the competing
needs of the protected species is heavily dependent on the facts of each case. In Tulare
Lake, these facts would include the following:
a determination of the quantity of water required to protect the Winter-Run Chinook
Salmon and the Delta Smelt (including the
water flows, pumping restrictions, and other
changes in project operations needed to ensure that the delivery of SWP water to the
plaintiffs would not be likely to jeopardize the
existence of the two species); an assessment
of the quantity of water used by the plaintiffs
to irrigate their crops (perhaps with a comparison of the water that would be needed if
67. The laws of most western states declare that "beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and the limit of all
rights to use water." See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45141(B) (1994 & 2001 Supp.); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.035
(1995); NM. Stat. 72-1-2 (1978 & 1997 Supp.); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 540.610(1) (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (1989); Wyo.
Rev. Code Ann. § 41-3-101 (2001); cf. Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 90.03.010 (1992) ("Subject to existing rights, all waters
within the state belong to the public, and any right thereto,
or the use thereof, shall be hereinafter acquired only by
appropriation for a beneficial use .... "). Most states also
prohibit the waste of water, although there is little agreement on what constitutes wasteful practices. See Steven I.
Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law, 61 Or. L. Rev. 483
(1982).
Beyond these basic principles, however, the definition of the property right in water varies widely among jurisdictions. The Utah Supreme Court, for example, has
construed the statutory mandate of beneficial use as including a reasonable use requirement. Thus, in In re Water
Rights of the Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d
77, 82, 348 P.2d 679, 682 (1960), the court held that "the
use of water must not only be beneficial to the lands of the
appropriators, but it must also be reasonable in relation to
the reasonable requirements of subsequent appropriators,
and the Court has the power to order improved methods of
conveying, measuring and diverting water so as to assure
the greatest possible use of the natural resource."
The Washington Supreme Court also has held that
water rights are limited by reasonable use and that a senior
appropriator may be required to use water in a "reasonably
efficient" manner. Although "Illocal custom and the relative efficiency of irrigation systems in common use are important elements," they "must be considered in connection
with other statutorily mandated factors, such as the costs
and benefits of improvements to irrigation systems, includ-
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alternative crops were grown or more efficient
irrigation practices employed); and an evaluation of the availability and cost of alternative
supplies (from water transfers and additional
pumping of groundwater).
Second, the legal standards used to evaluate the factual evidence will vary greatly
among jurisdictions. Although water rights in
most states are subject to the requirement of
reasonable or beneficial use, each state has
its own definition of what these principles
mean in practice. 6 7 Even in California-which
has perhaps the most expansive concept of
reasonable use-the Supreme Court has questioned whether the "test of unreasonable use
• . .referlsl only to inordinate and wasteful
use of water or to any use less than the optimum allocation of water."68 Moreover, most
other western states have not integrated the
69
public trust into their water rights systems.
In these states, analysis of the property right
ing the use of public and private funds to facilitate improvements." 121 Wash. 2d 459, 475, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053
(1993). The court rejected the claim that the reasonable
use analysis also must include the "impacts to the water
source and its flora and fauna," however, concluding that
"these factors cannot operate to impair existing water
rights." Id. at 475-76, 852 P.2d at 1053.
In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has stated
that water rights are "'regarded and protected as real property"' Town of Eureka v.State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 167,
826 P.2d 948, 951 (1992) (quoting Carson City v. Estate of
Lompa, 88 Nev. 541, 542, 501 P.2d 662, 662 (1972)). Although water rights are subject to the requirement of beneficial use and may be regulated according to the general
police power, they are not governed by the principle of reasonable use.
For summaries of each state's water law-including
reasonable and beneficial use decisions-see Robert E.
Beck, ed., 6 Waters and Water Rights, Part XIB (1991 ed. &
Supp. 2002).
68. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33
Cal.3d 419, 447 n.28, 658 P.2d 709, 728 n.28, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, 365 n.28 (1983) (citing Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal.
2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); loslin, 67 Cal.2d at ?, 429 P.2d
889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377.
69. The Washington Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have rejected the application of the public
trust as a potential limitation on the exercise of water
rights. Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d
219; 858 P.2d 232 (1993): In re Snake River Basin Adjudication, 128 Idaho 155, 157, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (1995).
In contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a statute in which the Arizona Legislature
declared that the "public trust is not an element of a water
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in water would focus only on the terms and
conditions set forth in the water right, applicable statutory law, and the doctrine of reasonable use.
Third, there may be temporal problems
associated with the reasonable use or public
trust argument. The Supreme Court has held
that property rights "are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." 70 Yet, the

Court also has cautioned that, while the law
that governs private property may change
over time, the takings clause imposes limits
on the state's power to redefine property
rights. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 71 for example, the Court declared

that "a state by ipse dixit may not transform
private property into public property without
compensation. This is the very kind of thing
that the Taking Clause ... was meant to prevent." 72 The application of the reasonable

use and public trust doctrines to limit the exercise of water rights for the benefit of endangered species and other environmental uses
thus presents its own takings question: When
the government restricts the impoundment or
diversion of water to prevent unreasonable
use or to protect the public trust, is it simply
asserting a public servitude (or some other
type of limitation) that inheres in the water
right, or is it effectively changing the definition of the property right in water to impose a
new limitation on the exercise of that right?
The California reasonable use and public
trust cases vividly illustrate this concern. As
right" in basin-wide adjudications." The Court reasoned
that the "public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation
on legislative power to give away resources held by the
state in trust for its people. The Legislature cannot order
the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to these or
any proceedings." San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
Court, 193 Ariz. 195, 215; 972 P.2d 179, 199 (1999) (citing
Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 172
Ariz. 356; 837 P.2d 158 (1991)). It concluded that the applicability of the public trust "depends on the facts before a
judge, not on a statute. It is for the courts to decide
whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts."
Id.
The Hawaii Supreme Court has decided that the
public trust applies to all water resources in the state, in-

described above, the California law of reasonable use is a dynamic and utilitarian construct. The property right in water is
dependent on the user's exercise of the right
in manner that is consistent with public policies that include a variety of factors that extend well beyond the water right holder's
purpose and efficiency of use. These factors
include competing demands for the available
water and the effects of the appropriation on
73
third parties and the environment.
Moreover, the definition of reasonable
use may change over time. The California
Court of Appeal stated this principle most
forcefully in its review of the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta Water Quality Control Plan and
Decision 1485. After observing that the
SWRCB had "determined that changed circumstances revealed in new information
about the adverse effects of the projects upon
the Delta necessitated revised water quality
standards," the court concluded that the state
"had the authority to modify the projects' permits to curtail their use of water on the
ground that the projects' use and diversion of
the water had become unreasonable."'7 4 The court
emphasized the flexibility of the reasonable
use inquiry. It reiterated that the SWRCB and
the courts have the power to decide that "particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their deleterious effects upon
water quality" and concluded that "some accommodation must be reached concerning
the major public interests at stake: the quality of valuable water resources and transport
of adequate supplies for needs southward.
The decision is essentially a policy judgment
cluding non-navigable surface waters and groundwater. In
re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Haw. 97, 9 P.3d 409
(2000). Relying both on the Hawaii Constitution and Audubon, the court also held that "the maintenance of waters in
their natural state constitutes a distinct 'use' under the
water resources trust." Id. at 136, 9 P.3d at 448.
70. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
71. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
72. Id. at 164.
73. See cases cited in notes 49 & 50 supra.
74. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187
(1986) (emphasis added).
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requiring a balancing of the competing public
interests."

75

It is certainly within California's (or any
other state's) authority to define the reasonable use doctrine in whatever way it believes
best serves the public interest in promoting
the fair, efficient, and socially beneficial use
of its scarce water resources. Yet, by defining
reasonable use-and hence the property right
in water-in this flexible and evolving manner,
California runs the risk that a court in a water
rights takings case will conclude that the
state's negation of a water right on the
ground that the use "had become unreasonable" is an ex post facto definition of the property
right.
The public trust doctrine presents similar concerns. In the Tulare Lake case, for example, the water rights permits for the State
Water Project were granted in 1967.76 Yet, the
California Supreme Court did not hold that
the interests protected by the public trust
doctrine include environmental quality and
resource preservation until 197 1. 7 7

And it

was not until its 1983 decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court78 that the court
held that the public trust may limit the exercise of California water rights. Thus, application of the public trust to determine the
plaintiffs' rights to water service in Tulare Lake
75. Id.
76. See id. at 106, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
77. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). The California Supreme Court observed that the public trust doctrine traditionally was "defined in terms of navigation, commerce and fisheries." Id.
at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796. It observed,
however, that the trust is
sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is
not burdened with an outmoded classification
favoring one mode of utilization over another.
There is a growing public recognition that one of
the most important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their
natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and
as environments which provide food and habitat
for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.
Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (citation
omitted). The court concluded that it "is not necessary to

also appears to involve a retroactive defini79
tion of the property right in water.
The key to this conundrum lies in the intricacies of California water rights law. For
the Tulare Lake plaintiffs, the answer is simple.
The water rights permits for the SWP create
only contingent property rights. A permit is
valid only "for such time as the water actually
appropriated under it is used for a useful and
beneficial purpose,"80 and the court of appeal
has ruled that the SWP permits are subject to
modification to comply with ambient water
quality standards, to fulfill the requirements
of reasonable use, to protect fish and wildlife,
and to promote the public trust. 8i Limitations on storage and diversion rights or other
changes in project operations to achieve
these purposes-even if imposed after the
SWP permits were granted-do not abridge
the water rights of the SWP, its contractors, or
project water users. As the California Supreme Court held more than a quarter century before the SWP permits were issued,
until an appropriator fulfills all conditions set
forth in its permit, and the permit is converted into a license, the appropriator "acquires no property right or any other right
82
against the state."
In other contexts, the question whether
application of contemporary concepts of reahere define precisely all the public uses which encumber
tidelands." Id.
78. 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346

(1983).
79. In addition, the public trust presents the same
flexible allocation questions that arise under the reasonable use doctrine. As the California Supreme Court held in
Audubon, in deciding whether a particular use of water complies with the public trust, a court must determine inter alia
whether the challenged appropriation outweighs the uses
protected by the trust-i.e., "whether some lesser taking
would better balance the diverse interests." Id. at 447, 658
P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
80. Cal. Water Code § 1390 (West 1971).
81. United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 127-33 & 148-52, 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 185-90 & 200-202 (1986).
82. East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Department
of Public Works, I Cal. 2d 476, 480-81, 35 P.2d 1027, 1029
(1935). Indeed, to underscore that the permittees hold
only a contingent interest in the appropriated water, the
California Water Code declares the interest to be noncompensable:
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sonable use and the public trust to define existing water rights is a taking of property is
more difficult to resolve. The answer will depend on the courts' historical analysis of the
doctrine of reasonable use itself.83 Do the

cases that articulate a dynamic and utilitarian
reasonable use doctrine as a tool of environmental protection represent a "fundamental
departure from stare decisis and ... traditional
rules of property"?8 4 Or, has California always
defined water rights in a mann'er that allows
the state continually to reevaluate both the
exercise of the right and the property right in
water based on evolving and contemporary
judgments of what is reasonable under the
circumstances?
Although a detailed analysis would extend well beyond the scope of this article, the
Every permittee, if he accepts a permit, does so
under the conditions precedent that no value
whatsoever in excess of the actual amount paid
to the State therefor shall at any time be assigned to or claimed for any permit granted or
issued under the provisions of this division, or
for any rights granted or acquired under the provisions of this division, in respect to the regulation by any competent public authority of the
services or the price of the services to be rendered by any permittee or by the holder of any
rights granted or acquired under the provisions
of this division ....
Cal. Water Code § 1392 (West 1971).
83. The California Supreme Court has held that the
determination whether a particular diversion or use of
water is consistent with the public trust ultimately comes
back to the question of reasonable use. As noted in the
text, the court declared in Audubon that "Iaill uses of water,
including public trust uses, must ... conform to the standard of reasonable use." 33 Cal. 3d at 443, 658 P.2d at 725,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 362. This means that the government may
reallocate water to serve public trust uses only if protection
of the public trust is reasonable under the circumstances-i.e., taking into account the consumptive users'
and the environmental needs, alternative sources of supply
(both for the consumptive use and the public trust), potential conservation measures, and other relevant factors.
Stated differently, water may be reallocated from a consumptive use to public trust purposes only if continuation
of the consumptive use would be unreasonable inter alia because of the harm it causes to the public trust. Thus, for
the purpose of defining the property right in water, the
public trust is subsumed within the doctrine of reasonable
use.
84. Clifford Schultz & Gregory Weber, Changing Public
Attitudes Toward Property Rights in California Water Resources:
From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 Pac. L.I. 1031,
1110 (1988) (citing National Audubon Society, 33 Cal.3d
419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346; United States v. State
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second question more accurately describes
the property right in water. I have written
previously on the history of reasonable use in
California and have come to the conclusion
that water rights are-and always have
been-fragile.85 Rights of diversion, storage,
and use that are granted in permits, licenses,
pre-1914 appropriative rights, and riparian
rights are neither fixed nor vested. The California Supreme Court has long held that a
use that was perfectly lawful when first recognized may not be lawful because changing
circumstances render the use unreasonable.
The changed circumstance may be a new,
competing consumptive use of the water, 86 or
it may be recognition of the cumulative effects of long-standing water uses on water

Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227
Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986)).
85. Brian E. Gray, "In Search of Bigfoot": The Common Law
Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, 17
Hastings Con. L.Q. 225 (1989). This article traces the history of the reasonable use doctrine from the earliest common law water rights cases through the enactment of
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution in 1928,
to the modern environmental applications of the doctrine.
I later summarized my interpretation of this history as follows:
ITIhe view that "reasonable water use is dependent upon not only the entire circumstances
presented but varies as the current situation
changes" is not new. Rather, it may be traced
back to the very first water rights case decided by
the California Supreme Court in 1855. This dynamic and utilitarian conception of water rights
formed the basis of the court's adoption of prior
appropriation as the water law of the West and
permeated its subsequent cases that recognized
the doctrine of riparian rights, incorporated the
principle of reasonable use, and ultimately integrated the riparian and appropriative systems.
Thus, the decisions and policies of the modern
era that sanction the reallocation of California's
water resources are simply the culmination of a
long history of state water rights, which regards
the property right in water as fragile and dependent on contemporary economic and societal values.
Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law, 45 Hastings L.I. 249, 307 (1994) (quoting United States v. State
Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 130,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (1986)).
86. See, e.g., Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation District, 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935); loslin, 67 Cal.2d 132,
429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377.
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quality, navigation, fisheries, and other in situ
87

uses.

The historical understanding of the reasonable use doctrine-and its influence on
the definition of the property right in
water-will be developed in future water rights
takings cases. For our purposes, it is adequate simply to emphasize that this historical
analysis must take place. If it does not-if the
courts compel the government to compensate water users when the government acts to
prevent an unreasonable use that is not part
of the water right-then water users will receive a windfall. For without a valid water
right-a right that may be exercised consistently with the inherent requirement of reasonable use-there can never be a taking of
property.
IV. Water Contracts.
"Congress can change federal policy, but it
cannot write on a blank slate. The old policies deposit a moraine of contracts, conveyances, expectations and investments. Lives,
families, businesses, and towns are built on
the basis of old policies. When Congress
changes course, its flexibility is limited by
those interests created under the old policies
which enjoy legal protection. Fairness toward
those who relied on continuation of past policies cuts toward protection. Flexibility, so
that government can adapt to changing conditions and changing majority preferences
cuts against. Expectations reasonably based
upon constitutionally protected property
rights are protected against policy changes by
the Fifth Amendment. Those based only on
economic and political predictions, not property rights, are not protected."
-Judge Andrew Kleinfeld, writing for
the Ninth Circuit in Madera Irrigation
District v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,
1400 (9th Cir. 1993).
Property rights in water also come in the
form of government contracts for water ser87. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal.
138, 4 P. 1152 (1884); Environmental Defense Fund v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District, 26 Cal.3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161
Cal. Rptr. 466 (1980); State Water Resources Control Board,
182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 127-33 & 148-52, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161,
185-90 & 200-202.
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vice. Cities and farms that receive their water
from the federal reclamation system have
contract rights-or are the beneficiaries of
water contracts-with the United States Bureau of Reclamation. In addition, water is delivered by contract in a number of states. The
California State Water Project is a notable example.
The takings law applicable to government contracts is cleaner in many respects
than the principles that govern alleged regu-"
latory takings of water rights. In the federal
reclamation system, for example, the water
user's rights vis-a-vis the United States are defined by the terms of the contract, and if the
Government violates those contract rights it
is obligated to compensate the user independent of the Fifth Amendment law of takings.
If the government regulation does not breach
the terms of the contract, however, there is
no liability. In either case, it is unnecessary
for the court to engage in the complex investigation into the nature of water rights described in the preceding section.
As with the water rights takings cases,
the most prominent litigation in which water
contractors (or contract beneficiaries) have
claimed that implementation of the modern
environmental laws has abridged their property rights arose out of the application of the
Endangered Species Act to reduce water service to agricultural users in the California's
88
San Joaquin Valley. In O'Neill v. United States,
a group of landowners within the Westlands
Water District claimed that the United States
breached its contract obligations to provide
water service from the Central Valley Project
when it delivered only fifty percent of stated
contract supplies during the 1993 water
year.8 9 California had suffered from six years
of drought, and storage within the CVP was
severely depleted. Moreover, the Bureau of
Reclamation was constrained by several laws
to allocate a portion of project water supplies
to environmental and other nonconsumptive
88. 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).

89. The Westlands Water Service Contract, which was
executed in 1963 for a term of 40 years, authorizes the district to receive 900,000 acre feet of project water each year
from the CVP's Delta pumping facilities. See id. at 680.
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uses. Decision 1485 required the Bureau to
release sufficient water from project reservoirs to comply with the ambient water quality standards set forth in the Water Quality
Control Plan for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta and Suisun Marsh; and the biological
opinions for the Sacramento River WinterRun Chinook Salmon and the Delta Smelt directed it to curtail pumping and to alter project operations as necessary to protect the
two species.90 The Bureau also was subject
to a new law, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992,91 which added "fish
and wildlife mitigation, protection, and restoration" to the list of authorized purposes of
the project and ordered the Bureau to undertake a variety of specific measures to mitigate
the damage to fish, wildlife, riparian habitat,
wetlands, stream flows, water quality, and
other environmental values caused by CVP
operations over the past fifty years. 9 2 The
most important of these measures (and the
one that gave rise to the O'Neill litigation) was
the directive that, upon enactment of the
CVPIA, the Bureau shall "dedicate and manage annually 800,000 acre feet of Central Valley Project yield for the primary purpose of
implementing the fish, wildlife, and habitat
restoration purposes and measures author93
ized by [the Actl."
These laws combined to create what the
CVP contractors characterized as a "regulatory
drought." In other words, the legal requirements that the Bureau of Reclamation release
project water (or limit diversions) to provide
additional water to fish and other environmental uses create water shortages within the
90. Id.at 681.
91. Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992).
92. Id. § 3406.
93. Id.§ 3406(b)(2).
94. This concern was prescient. In water year 1998,
which produced approximately 160 percent of average precipitation statewide (170% of average in the Sacramento
River basin), the Bureau delivered only 85 percent of stated
contract supplies to CVP agricultural contractors located
south of the Delta. See Glenn Martin, El Niuo's Gift to Irrigation Dependent State is a Huge Snowpack, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 1,
1998, at AI5. For water year 2002-which the Bureau has
classified as a "dry" year, the latest water allocation for
these contractors is 60 percent. United States Bureau of
Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Region, Reclamation. Announces an

system that would not otherwise exist. The
fifty percent supply deficiency that spawned
the O'Neill case occurred in a 120 percent of
average water year, for example, and CVP
contractors worried that regulatory shortages
would become a permanent feature of project
94
operations.
The plaintiffs in O'Neill alleged that the
Bureau's failure to provide full water service
to them as beneficiaries of the Westlands
contract was a breach of that contract. The
plaintiffs did not sue for damages. Rather,
they requested specific performance of the
contract and asked the court to enforce a
1986 stipulated judgment in which the United
States agreed that the Westlands contract
was valid. Although the O'Neill litigation
therefore was not a conventional takings
case, it nonetheless illustrates how the property right in water supplied under contract is
determined. For the court to decide whether
to enforce the Westlands contract, it must
first find that the contract conferred on the
plaintiffs the rights they claimed-viz, full
water service despite the contrary mandates
of the Endangered Species Act and the
CVPIA. As the Ninth Circuit held in an earlier
takings case based on the alleged impairment
of CVP contracts, "the first step in -both due
process and taking analyses is to determine
whether there is a property right that is pro' 95
tected by the Constitution."
The district court and the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the
United States breached its obligations under
the Westlands contract. 96 The Ninth Circuit
Increase in CVP Water Supply Allocation for Water Year 2002 (May
16, 2002).
95. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d
799, 807 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986); Federal
Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,

91 (1958)).
96. Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water District,
849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd sub nom. O'Neill v.
United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). In the companion case of Westlands Water District v. United States, 850 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1994), judge Oliver Wanger also ruled
that the United States did not breach the Westlands contract when it reduced water service to the district in water
year 1993. The Westlands case was a multifaceted attack on
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based its decision on three grounds. First,
the court held that the Westlands contract
does not confer on the district (or its members) the right to full water service when there
is insufficient water to enable the Bureau of
Reclamation to fulfill both its contract obligations and the in situ water requirements established by state and federal environmental
laws. Article II of the Westlands contract-which is titled "United States Not Liable for Water Shortage"-states that "[tihere
may occur at times during any year a shortage
in the quantity of water available for furnishing to the District ...but in no event shall
any liability accrue against the United States
•

.

. for any damages

.

.

. arising from a

shortage on account of errors in operation,
drought, or any other causes."97 In the Ninth Cir-

cuit's opinion, the highlighted phrase encompasses water shortages that arise from any
cause, and the contract therefore "unambiguously absolves the government from liability
for its failure to deliver the full contractual
amount of water where there is a shortage
98
caused by statutory mandate."
Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that this exclusion from liability is
ambiguous in light of a different article of the
contract that, in the plaintiffs' view, protected
them from legal changes that might reduce
their water supplies during the term of the
contract. Article 26 provides that "[iln the
event that the Congress of the United States
...amends.., provisions of the Federal recthe CVPIA and included the claim that the implementation
of the Endangered Species Act and the CVPIA was a taking
of the district's contract rights. After Judge Oliver Wanger
decided against Westlands, he permitted the O'Neill plaintiffs-who were landowners within the "Area I" region of the
Westlands Water District-to intervene for the purpose of
appealing the decision. The takings claim is now before
the Ninth Circuit in Orff v. United States, No. 00-16922 (appeal pending).
97. See O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 682 n.2 (quoting Westlands
Water Service Contract art. I I(a)) (emphasis added). Article I I also provides that if "in any year there is delivered to
the District by reason of any shortage or apportionment as
provided in subdivision (a) of this article ... less than the
quantity of water which the District otherwise would be entitled to receive, there shall be made an adjustment on account of the amounts paid to the United States by the
District for water for said year . . .To the extent of such
deficiency, such adjustment shall constitute the sole remedy of the
District or anyone having or claiming to have by, through, or under

lamation laws, the United States agrees, at
the option of the District, to negotiate
amendments of appropriate articles of this
contract, all consistently with the provisions
of such . . . amendment.' 99 According to the
court of appeals- "IaIrticle 26 is not at all inconsistent with the notion that 'any other
causes' broadly and unambiguously contemplates the effects of subsequent Congressional mandates"-viz. the enactment and
implementation of the Endangered Species
Act and the CVPIA. "Relieving the government from liability for delivering Westlands'
full contractual amount of water where a reduction is mandated by statute," the court
reasoned, "is not incompatible with giving
Westlands an option to renegotiate its contract to conform to changes in reclamation
law."100 Indeed,the anticipation of future legal changes embodied in article 26 does not
insulate Westlands' water service rights from
new environmental laws. Rather, it merely
gives the plaintiffs "'a choice between renegotiating their contracts to bring them into
conformity with the new law or withdrawing
from the reclamation program."' 0 1 As the
Ninth Circuit held in an earlier breach of contract challenge to the Reclamation Reform
Act,

0

2

this article does not grant project

water users "the right to continue to receive
reclamation water under the terms of the preexisting contracts if those terms violate the
10
newly amended law."'

3

the District the right to the use of any of the water supply provided for
herein." Id. (quoting Westlands Water Service Contract art.
11 (b)) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 689.
99. See id. at 683 (quoting Westlands Water Service
Contract art. 26).
100. Id. at 684.
101. Id. at 683-84 (quoting Peterson v. Department of
the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 812 (9th Cir. 1990)).
102. 43 U.S.C A. §§ 390aa et seq. (1986).
103. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d
799, 812 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs in Peterson included
most of the CVP contractors, as well as other beneficiaries
of water supplied by the project. They alleged that the
United States breached their water service contracts by
changing both the price of project water and the eligibility
requirements to participate in the federal reclamation program during the term of their contracts. The Ninth Circuit
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Third, the court of appeals concluded
that, even if the Westlands contract "did obligate the government to supply, without exception, 900,000 acre-feet of water," the
plaintiffs "would still not be entitled to prevail as the contract is not immune from subsequently enacted

statutes."'10 4

The court

relied on a series of United States Supreme
Court opinions that articulate special rules of
interpretation that apply to contracts to
which the federal government is a party.
These rules recognize that the United States
acts in both a proprietary capacity and as a
sovereign government:
While the Federal Government, as
sovereign, has the power to enter
contracts that confer vested rights,
and the concomitant duty to honor
those rights, we have declined in the
context of commercial contracts to
find that a "sovereign forever waives
the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly
reserves the right to exercise that
power in" the contract. Rather, we
have emphasized that "[without] regard to its source, sovereign power,
even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's
jurisdiction, and will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable
terms." Therefore, contractual arrangements, including those to which
a sovereign itself is party, "remain
subject to subsequent legislation" by
0 5
the sovereign. 1

According to the Ninth Circuit, there is
nothing in the Westlands contract that "surrenders in 'unmistakable terms' Congress'
sovereign power" to enact new laws such as
concluded that the plaintiffs did not possess the contract
rights they were asserting and therefore rejected their takings and due process claims.
104. O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686.
105. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Merrion
v. licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
106. O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686.
107. Id.
108. Id

the Endangered Species Act and the CVPIA
and to direct federal agencies such as NMFS,
USFWS, and the Bureau of Reclamation to
apply those laws to existing water service
contracts. Nor do the contracts purport to
exempt Westlands (or its water users) from
the effects of these laws.' 0 6 Rather, the contract "contemplates future changes in reclamation laws in Article 26, and Article 11
limits the government's liability for shortages
due to any causes."'1 7 The court concluded
that the Endangered Species Act and the
CVPIA "markled] a shift in reclamation law
modifying the priority of water uses" and
there is "nothing in the contract that pre08
cludes such a shift."'
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in O'Neill illustrates the elements of the plaintiff's case
in a breach of contract action against the
United States. A water contractor (or contract
beneficiary) must prove that the contract
grants it the right to full water service under
conditions of hydrologic and regulatory
drought; and the contract (or underlying legislation) must expressly and unmistakably
protect the plaintiff from the effects of new
laws that alter the terms of the contract or
render full performance of the contract illegal.
Since the decision in O'Neill, the law of
government contracts has changed in one
significant respect. In United States v. Winstar
Corp., 10 9 the Supreme Court held that the
United States may be liable for damages for
breach of a contract to which the Government
is a party when Congress amends the law to
eliminate (or to diminish) the rights of the
contractor in violation of an express provision
of the contract in which the Government assumed the risk of such regulatory change." 0
109. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
110. In Winstar, the Supreme Court held that the
United States was liable for damages for breach of contract
for Congress' enactment, and the Office of Thrift Supervision's implementation, of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").
The litigation arose out of contracts between the Federal
Bank Board (the predecessor of OTS) and three savings and
loan institutions that the Board and the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") had encouraged
to acquire insolvent savings and loan companies. One of
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Justice Souter's plurality opinion carefully
stated that the contracts at issue in Winstar
did
not purport to bind the Congress from
enacting regulatory measures, and respondents do not ask the courts to infer from silence any such limit on
sovereign power as would violate the
holdings of Merrion and Cherokee Nation. The contracts have been read as
solely risk-shifting agreements and respondents seek nothing more than
the benefit of promises by the Government to insure them against any
losses arising from future regulatory
change. They seek no injunction
against application of the law to
them, as the plaintiffs did in Bowen
and Merrion, and they acknowledge
that the [contracting federal agencies]
could not bind Congress (and possibly could not even bind their future
selves) not to change regulatory policy.
Nor do the damages respondents
seek amount to exemption from the
new law, in the manner of the compensation sought in Bowen. Once general jurisdiction to make an award
the Bank Board's duties was to establish minimum capital
reserve requirements for all thrift institutions. Because the
acquisition by a "healthy" S&L of an insolvent institution
could push the acquiring thrift's net assets below the minimum capital reserve requirements (or, in some cases, even
into insolvency), the Bank Board agreed to use a special
accounting method for these "supervisory mergers." The
Bank Board promised that the acquiring S&L could treat
the difference between the failed S&L's assets and liabilities (in all cases a negative number) as an asset, rather
than as a liability. The Bank Board called this fictitious asset "supervisory goodwill" and promised the acquiring
thrifts that they could amortize the supervisory goodwill
over a period of 25 to 40 years. Id. at 847-51.
In FIRREA, Congress amended the law to make performance of these two promises illegal. The statute required each thrift to maintain "core capital" reserves of not
less than three percent of the S&L's total assets, and it defined "core capital" to exclude "unidentified intangible assets" such as goodwill. Id. at 856-58. Congress thus took
away precisely what the Bank Board had promised the
three plaintiff institutions as an essential inducement to
them to acquire failed thrifts. In response to the enactment of FIRREA, the OTS (as successor to the Bank Board)
promptly issued new regulations that eliminated the concept of supervisory goodwill. This action in turn caused
each of the plaintiff S&L's to fall below the core capital reserve requirements set forth in FIRREA," Id. The enact-
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against the Government is conceded,
a requirement to pay money supposes no surrender of sovereign
power by a sovereign with the power
to contract. ' I

The decision in Winstar thus amends the
elements of a breach of contract case against
the United States: a plaintiff may recover
damages for breach of its federal contract if
the contract confers the right that is allegedly
impaired by the government regulation, and
the contract anticipates the enactment and
implementation of the new law that authorized the regulation by expressly assigning financial liability for such regulatory change to
the United States. If the plaintiff is suing to
enjoin the application of the new law, however, the analysis remains the same as set
forth in O'Neill. A federal contract does not
insulate the contractor from the effects of
subsequent congressional action to alter the
terms of the contract (or to modify its performance) unless the contract contains an
"unmistakable waiver" of that sovereign
power. As Justice Souter stated in his plurality opinion in Winstar, "a contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include
ment and application of FIRREA thus breached the express
terms of the contracts to which the United States was a
party and rendered the contracting thrifts "insolvent" according to the newly defined capital standards.
In concluding that the United States was liable for
damages for breach of contract, the Supreme Court accepted two findings of the Court of Federal Claims and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. First, the United
States promised that the special accounting principles
used to measure minimum capital requirements would remain in effect for the duration of the amortization period
applicable to such capital assets. See id.
at 862-64 (plurality
opinion); id. at 919 (Scalia, I.,
concurring in the judgment).
Second, "when the law as to capital requirements changed
(because of the enactment of FIRREA] . . .. the Government was unable to perform its promise and, therefore, became liable for breach." Id. at 870 (plurality opinion).
Under these circumstances, although Congress retained its
sovereign power to change the law and thereby to bar "the
Government from specifically honoring its agreements, we
hold that the terms assigning the risk of regulatory change
to the Government are enforceable, and that the Government is therefore liable in damages for breach." Id. at 843
(plurality opinion); see id.
at 919 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the
judgment).
111.Id. at 881; see id. at 920-21 (Scalia, I.,
concurring in
the judgment).
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an unstated term exempting the other contracting party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act (including an Act of
Congress), nor will an ambiguous term of a
grant or contract be construed as a convey' 12
ance or surrender of sovereign power.""
The O'Neill plaintiffs have renewed their
breach of contract claim against the United
States and are now seeking damages instead
of equitable enforcement of the contract.'"'
Winstar will not affect the analysis of the
Westlands water service contract set forth in
O'Neill, however, for two reasons. First,
(before and after Winstar) the plaintiffs must
establish that the Westlands contract grants
them the right to full water service notwithstanding the mandates of the Endangered
Species Act and the CVPIA. But the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted the contract as not
conferring such a right, because Article 11
"unambiguously absolves the government
from liability for its failure to deliver the full
contractual amount of water where there is a
14
shortage caused by statutory mandate."''
Second, as with the contracts in Winstar, the
Westlands water service contract contains
"risk-shifting" language. Unlike those contracts, however, the Westlands contract expressly assigns the financial risk of future
112. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
113. The breach of contract claim, along with an array
of statutory, administrative law, and common law challenges to the application of the Endangered Species Act
and the CVPIA are now pending before the Ninth Circuit.
Orff v. United States, No. 00-16922 (appeal pending). The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Government after concluding that the plaintiffs were not
third-party beneficiaries of the Westlands water service
contract. The court based this decision on Klamath Water
Users Protective Association v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206
(9th Cir. 1999), which held that recipients of water from the
Klamath Project have no rights to sue under the provisions
of a contract between the Bureau of Reclamation and the
California-Oregon Power Company that governs the operation of the Link River Dam.
114. O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 686.
115. Id. at 683-84 (quoting Peterson v. Department of
the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 812 (9th Cir. 1990)).
116. In the Central Valley Project, for example, the
"Exchange Contract" between the Bureau of Reclamation
and four San Joaquin Valley agricultural water agencies
contains a significantly different shortage provision than
those set forth in the CVP water service contracts and does
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regulatory changes to the contractors, rather
than placing liability for that risk on the
United States. Article 26 "contemplates future changes in reclamation laws" and provides that in the event of such changes the
contractors have no rights to water service in
violation of the amended law or to damages
for water shortages caused by the Bureau of
Reclamation's compliance with the new law.
Rather, the contractor's only right in response
to such regulatory changes is the choice of
"'renegotiating their contracts to bring them
into Conformity with the new law or withdraw15
ing from the reclamation program.""'
O'Neill suggests the difficulty that federal
water contractors and project water users
may have in establishing a claim for breach of
contract for water shortages caused by the
Bureau of Reclamation's compliance with the
Endangered Species Act and other contemporary environmental laws. Yet, as with the
water rights cases discussed in part Ill, it is
impossible to reach generalized conclusions
because the federal reclamation contracts
vary from project-to-project and sometimes
differ among contractors in the same project.1 16 A brief look at the Klamath Basin takings litigation, however, will illustrate how
not include any provision that resembles article 26 of the
Westlands contract (a provision that is common to the
other CVP water service contracts). These differences are
based on the type of water supply provided to the contractor. The "exchange contractors" had pre-project water
rights to the flow of the San Joaquin River that were destroyed by the construction and operation of Friant Dam,
and their contract reflects this fact. The United States
agreed to provide Sacramento River water to these users
from the CVP Delta pumping facilities in exchange for the
contractors' forbearance of their pre-project water rights in
the San Joaquin River. In contrast, most of the CVP water
service contracts authorize the delivery of project water to
users who either did not have pre-project water rights or
did not give up any water rights as a condition of receiving
water service from the CVP. See Westlands Water District v.
United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
For a comparison of the Exchange Contract with
other CVP water service contracts, see Central Valley Project Documents Part 2, Operating Documents, H.R. Doc.
No. 246, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. (1957) (amended exchange
contract); Westlands Water District v. United States, 850 F.
Supp. 1388, 1395-98 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (five CVP water service contracts).

Fall 2002
the principles of O'Neill and Winstar apply in
7
other contexts." 1
In April 2001, the Bureau of Reclamation
announced that it would deliver only about
ten percent of the water that it normally supplies to 1,200 farms in the Klamath Basin.
Farmers in nineteen of the twenty-one irrigation districts served by the Bureau would receive no water at all. As in the SWP and CVP
cases, this acute water shortage was the result of hybrid drought. The previous winter's
snowpack and spring rains were among the
lowest in recorded history, and the Bureau
classified water year 2001 as a "critical dry"
year. After consultations with USFWS and
NMFS under section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, the Bureau announced that only
70,000 acre feet of Klamath Project Water
would be available for irrigation uses served
by two of the reservoirs in the southern part
of the basin. The balance of the water in the
system, including all of the water impounded
by the largest facility, Upper Klamath Lake,
would be kept in the reservoirs to support
two species of suckerfish-the Lost River and
Shortnose Suckers-or released for the benefit
8
of migrating Coho Salmon."1
Headgates were closed on April 7, 2001.
Water users brought suit in federal court in
Eugene to enjoin the Bureau from withholding irrigation water, but Judge Ann Aiken denied their request. She concluded: "While the
court sympathizes with plaintiffs and their
plight, I am bound by oath to uphold the law.
The law requires the protection of suckers
and salmon as endangered and threatened
species and as tribal trust resources, even if
plaintiffs disagree with the manner in which
the fish are protected or believe that they inequitably bear the burden of such protection."119
117. Reed Benson has written a detailed histroy of
the events that led to the Klamath Basin Controversy.
Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break:
Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 Tulare
Environmental Law Journal 197 (2002).
118. In 1988, the USFWS listed the Lost River and
Shortnose Suckers as endangered. 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130
(luly 18, 1988). Acting pursuant to court order, NMFS
listed the Coho Salmon as a threatened species in 1998.
63 Fed. Reg. 42, 587 (Aug. 10, 1998).
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As fields were fallowed, and the farmlands and wetlands in the basin began to dry
out over the summer, the Klamath Basin became the epicenter of the national debate
over the Endangered Species Act. Although
the Bureau later released 75,000 acre feet
from Upper Klamath Lake, the water was too
late for many farmers and ran out in less than
a month. In October, thirteen irrigation districts and twelve individual water users filed
suit against the United States in the Court of
Federal Claims, alleging that the reductions
in water service caused by the Bureau of Reclamation's compliance with the Endangered
Species Act constituted a taking of their water
rights without just compensation in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs asked
the Court to certify the case as a class action,
and they have claimed damages in excess of
$1 billion.

120

It is not surprising that the Klamath Project contractors and water users would file a
takings claim seeking compensation for the
economic losses they have suffered. Although there have been increasing conflicts
between agricultural demands and the needs
of fish for more than a decade, the events of
2001-complete elimination of water service
to most of the farms in the basin-was unprecedented. What is striking about the Klamath takings claim, however, is that the
plaintiffs have misstated the nature of their
property rights to the water supplied by the
Klamath Project. The complaint asserts that
the reduction in water service for 2001 was a
taking of their water rights without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'

21

The problem with this allegation is

that it ignores the document that defines the
plaintiffs' rights vis-a-vis the United
States-their federal reclamation contracts.
119. Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192,
1210 (D. Ore. 2001).
120. Complaint for Just Compensation and Damages,
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, No. 01-591 L
(Fed. CI. filed Oct. 11, 2001).
121. Id. at 13. The complaint alleges that "under the
constraints imposed by Ithel biological opinions, plaintiffs
will not receive water in dry or normal years, i.e., six to
seven years out of 10" and that farming in the Klamath Ba-
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The complaint states that each of the
plaintiffs "is either a landowner or a legal representative of landowners who possess appurtenant water rights" and that they receive
their irrigation water from the Klamath Project.'

22

Even if this allegation

is true, it

misses the point. The action that the plaintiffs allege was a taking was the Bureau of
Reclamation's failure to deliver project water;
and the plaintiffs' rights to receive water from
the Klamath Project are defined by their contracts, not by any pre-project water rights
they might possess. The plaintiffs' takings
claim therefore will stand or fall on the terms
of their contracts.
In the contracts for the Klamath Project,
the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to supply
water from the project to irrigation districts
and other water agencies in the Klamath Basin. The contracts do not enumerate a fixed
quantity of water that the districts are entitled to receive each year. Rather, they identify the lands within the districts that will
receive project water. Until recently, the Bureau's practice has been simply to deliver
water to each contractor as needed to irrigate
these lands. As with the CVP water service
contracts, however, the Klamath contracts
contain a provision titled: "United States Not
Liable for Water Shortage." The wording of
this article differs slightly from the shortage
provision of the Westlands water service contract analyzed in O'Neill. Article 26 of the Klamath contracts provides:
On account of drought or other
causes, there may occur at times a
shortage in the quantity of water
available in Project reservoirs and,
while the United States will use all
reasonable means to guard against
such shortage, in no event shall any
liability accrue against the United
sin "is not viable in these circumstances." Id. It also states
a claim for impairment of water rights under the Klamath
Basin Compact of 1957. California Water Code §§ 59005901 (West 1971).
122 Id. at 11.
123. See, e.g., Amendatory Contract Between the
United States of America and the Klamath Irrigation District at 26 (Nov. 29, 1954); Contract Between the United

States . . . for any damage, direct or
indirect, arising therefrom .... 121
Article 27 then declares that neither party
"shall be considered to be in default in respect to any obligation hereunder, if prevented from fulfilling such obligation by
reason of uncontrollable force."'

24

The con-

tracts define the term "uncontrollable force"
to mean "any cause beyond the control of the
party affected, including but not limited to
. . .restraint by court or public authority,
which by exercise of due diligence and foresight such party could not reasonably have
'
been expected to avoid."'

25

These contract terms will determine
whether the plaintiffs have the property rights
they claim in the takings litigation-the right
to receive project water under conditions of
drought when the release of water for the
benefit of the contractors (in the judgment of
NMFS and USFWS) would be likely to jeopardize the existence of the three species of
fish protected under the Endangered Species
Act. The principles of contract interpretation
set forth in O'Neill, Winstar, and the other
cases described above suggest that it will be
difficult for the plaintiffs to establish this
right.
The Klamath contracts acknowledge that
water shortages periodically will occur within
the project, and the contracts expressly exempt the United States from liability for such
shortages. As with the CVP supply deficiencies adjudicated in O'Neill, the 2001 Klamath
shortages were caused by a combination of
low precipitation and storage in the basin
and the directives of the Endangered Species
Act. Article 26 of the Klamath contracts stipulates that "in no event shall any liability accrue against the United States" for water
shortages that are the result of "drought or
other causes." The Ninth Circuit's interpretaStates and the Tulelake Irrigation District at 31 (Sep. 10,
1956).
124. Id.
125. Id. Other examples of uncontrollable forces are:
"failure of facilities, flood, earthquake, storm, lightning,
fire, epidemic, war, riot, civil disturbance, labor disturbance, landl sabotage." Id.
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tion of "other causes" in O'Neill to include
"shortagelsl caused by statutory mandate"
should serve alone to dispose of the plaintiffs' contention that the United States has
breached its contract obligations.
Unlike the Westlands contract, however,
the Klamath shortage provisions also contain
the caveat that "the United States will use all
reasonable means to guard against such
shortage." The plaintiffs might argue that the
Government has violated this clause by enacting and implementing the Endangered
Species Act, which created (or at least exacerbated) the supply deficiencies within the project. However, this argument would neglect
the placement of the clause in Article 26. The
"reasonable efforts" reference appears just
before the absolute exemption from liability
embodied in the statement that "in no event
shall any liability accrue against the United
States ...for any damage" arising from water
shortages. Read in context, the Government's promise to "use all reasonable means
to guard against such shortagels]" may create
an enforceable duty to protect against supply
deficiencies (for example, by not contracting
for the sale of water beyond the firm yield of
the project), but it does not give the contractors a right to compensation for the Government's failure in this regard.
Nor could this clause be interpreted to
prevent the United States from enforcing the
mandates of the Endangered Species Act
without violating the Supreme Court's admonition that "'sovereign power... is an enduring presence that governs all contracts .. .
and will remain in effect unless surrendered
in unmistakable terms."' 126 The Government's

promise to use reasonable efforts to protect
against water shortages is hardly an unmistakable waiver of Congress' sovereign authority to enact and to implement new laws that
govern the Klamath Project. A more plausible interpretation of the clause would distinguish between the United States' role as
proprietor of the water supplied by the pro126. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Merrion
v.licarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
127. 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999).
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ject and the United States as a sovereign government. Under this construction, the
Bureau of Reclamation would be required to
use reasonable means to guard against water
shortages in its management and operation
of the project, but would not be constrained
by contract from complying with the directives of all laws-including new laws enacted
by Congress in its sovereign capacity-that
govern project operations.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has already
reached this conclusion. In Klamath Water
Users Protective Association v. Patterson,127 project
water users argued that the Bureau had no
authority to order the California Oregon
Power Company, which manages the Link
River Dam under contract with the United
States, to operate the dam in compliance
with the biological opinions for the Coho
Salmon and the two protected species of
suckerfish. The court of appeals rejected this
contention:
It is well settled that contractual arrangements can be altered by subsequent Congressional legislation ....
Even in circumstances where the ESA
was passed well after the agreement,
the legislation still applies as long as
the federal agency retains some measure of control over the activity.
Therefore, when an agency, such as
Reclamation, decides to take action,
the ESA generally applies to the con28

tract. 1

The court therefore held that performance of
the Klamath Project contract at issue was
subject to the mandates of the Endangered
Species Act.
Finally, under Winstar, there is nothing in
the Klamath contracts that expressly assigns
financial responsibility for changes in the law
governing project operations to the United
States. In fact, the contracts provide to the
contrary. As discussed above, article 26 declares that "in no event" shall the United
States be liable for water shortages that re128. Id. at 1213 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982); O'Neill v. United States, 50
F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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suit from drought or other causes. And article 27 reinforces this admonition by declaring
neither party to be in default of its contract
obligations "if prevented from fulfilling such
obligation by reason of uncontrollable force
...

including, but not limited to

. ..

restraint

by court or public authority." The parties
thus have anticipated that outside
forces-including actions based on legal mandates-might limit performance of the contract at some point in the future. The
operating constraints that reduced project
water deliveries in 2001 were imposed by
public authorities-NMFS and USFWS. Indeed, the consultations that preceded the biological opinions were themselves the result
129
of a court order.

The Klamath Project water contracts thus
expressly absolve the United States of liability for all types of water shortages-hydrologic, regulatory, or hybrid-that may occur
within the system. As such, the contractors
and beneficiaries have no "property" right to
receive project water in violation of the directives of the Endangered Species Acts or other
laws that govern project operations. The
United States therefore has not breached its
contract obligations, nor has it taken property
without just compensation.
V. Conclusion.
"There remains, finally, the question that has
loomed ominously in the background, awaiting its turn to cause mischief. If lawmakers
do wield the power to redefine private water
rights, is there any limit to how far they can
go? Can they redefine property rights into
oblivion? Is there a usable distinction between redefinition and confiscation?"
-Eric

T. Freyfogle, "Water Rights
and the Common Wealth,"
26 Environmental Law 27, 46 (1996).

broad and adaptive regulatory powers on the
government and concomitantly limit the
plaintiffs' rights to appropriate or to receive
water under conditions that conflict with statutory mandates to protect endangered species, water quality, and other environmental
interests. Yet these examples should not detract from the article's central thesis-that the
statutes, constitutional law, judicial decisions, and contract terms that define the
property right in water must be carefully studied in every case to determine whether the
plaintiff has "private property" capable of being taken by the government regulation in
question.
In states such as California that-by constitutional mandate, statutory directive, and
common law doctrine-have conferred only a
conditional and fragile property right in
water, few water rights takings cases are likely
to succeed. In other states-which have not
recognized the public trust as a potential restraint on water rights and where the doctrines of reasonable and beneficial use have
only narrow application-claims for just compensation for regulatory impairments of
"vested" water rights stand a much better
chance. Similarly, the rights of water contractors in the federal reclamation system depend entirely on the terms and conditions of
their contracts. Users whose rights to project
water are based on agreements that resemble
the Westlands and Klamath contracts are unlikely to prevail on breach of contract claims.
Federal reclamation contractors whose contracts do not include broad shortage provisions and express exemption of government
liability may present viable claims that the
United States is responsible for "regulatory
water shortages" caused by water supply and
operational restrictions imposed under the
Endangered Species Act or other environmental laws.

The cases analyzed in this article suggest
that the plaintiffs' burden of establishing
compensable property rights is a difficult
one, because both the water rights law and
the contracts at issue in these cases confer

Moreover, even in situations where the
water right or contract is defined in a manner
that preserves broad regulatory authority to
limit the right to protect environmental interests, the government must have a lawful rea-

129. Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations v. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. supp. 2d 1228, 1251

(N.D. Cal. 2001); see Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp.
2d 1192, 1199-1200 (D. Ore. 2001).
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son to reallocate water from the consumptive
uses embodied in the water or contract right
to the instream uses it is acting to protect. In
the Klamath Basin, for example, a research
committee appointed by the National Academy of Sciences has tentatively concluded
that "there is no substantial scientific foundation at this time" to support the principal
change in project operations set forth in the
2001 biological opinions for the Coho Salmon
and Lost River and Shortnose Suckers.'

30

The

committee specifically found that there was
no evidence to support the Fish and Wildlife
Service's findings that the suckerfish would
benefit from maintenance of higher water
levels in the Upper Klamath Reservoir that
existed during water years 1990 through 2000.
It also tentatively concluded that retention of
water in the reservoir for later release to support migrating salmon, as directed by NMFS,
actually could harm the salmon by increasing
the temperature of the water in the main
stem of the Klamath River below the reservoir.

13

The committee's Klamath Basin study
will not be completed for at least another
year, and the committee's final conclusions
in any event will not carry the force of law.
The investigation into the science behind the
biological opinions, however, illustrates the
potential interplay between judicial review of
agency decisions on the merits and judicial
130. National Research Council, Interim Report from the
Committee on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath
River Basin: Scientific Evaluation of Biological Opinions on Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin 3 (2002)
(prepublication copy).
131. Id. at 2-3. The committee also stated, however,
that "there is no scientific basis for operating the lake at
mean minimum levels below the recent historical ones
(1990-2000)," as the Bureau of Reclamation had proposed
before consultation with NMFS and USFWS, because
"lower lake levels would require acceptance of undocumented risk to suckers." Id. at 3.
132. As noted in part 111,
judicial review of the scientific basis and justification for regulatory actions to protect
environmental interest would be under a highly deferential
standard. Federal agency decisions are reviewed under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (1996).
See supra note 67. In most jurisdictions, state regulatory actions would be subject to a comparably deferential standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. State Water

analysis of takings claims. If a takings plaintiff can prove that there was no lawful justification for the regulatory decision that caused
(or exacerbated) the water shortages for
which the plaintiff seeks compensation, the
government should be held liable. Although
water rights (and contract rights) are limited
forms of property, they are nonetheless property. If the government cannot defend the actions that led it to restrict the exercise of the
plaintiff's water rights (or to reduce water service .to its contractors), it acts beyond the
scope of the limitations embodied in the
32
plaintiff's property rights in water.
With this caveat, takings claims based on
water rights and water contracts will stand or
fall on the court's determination of the plaintiffs' property rights vis-a-vis the government.
Indeed, in many situations, the property
rights inquiry will be an all or nothing decision. In the water contract cases, if the parties have assigned financial responsibility for
water shortages caused by the enactment and
enforcement of new environmental laws to
the government, and a water shortage occurs
because performance of the contract is limited by the implementation of such a law,
then the government will be liable for damages for breach of contract. If the contract is
silent on this question, or expressly exempts
the government from liability for water
shortages, the courts may not find a breach of
Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 113, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 176 (1986).
It is possible, of course, that the terms of some
water contracts might preclude liability even where the
government cannot defend the factual or scientific basis for
the water shortage that resulted from regulatory action.
For example, the Westlands contract excuses the United
States from liability for water shortages that are caused by
"errors in operation." See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d
677, 682 n.2 (quoting Westlands Water Service Contract art.
I I(a)). And the Klamath contracts state that "in no event
shall any liability accrue against the United States" for
water shortages. In the only judicial opinion on this point,
Judge Wanger held that the shortage provision of the
Westlands contract would not absolve the United States
from liability if the plaintiffs could prove either "that there
was no CVP water shortage" or that the Bureau's implementation of the Endangered Species Act and the CVPIA
"were unlawful or unreasonable in light of the Bureau's
contractual duties." Orff v. United States, No. CV-F-93-5327
OWW SMS, Memorandum Opinion and Order (E.D. Cal.
1997), at 64-65, appeal pending, No. 00-16922 (9th Cir.).
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contract based on the government's enactment and implementation of new laws that
alter the other terms of the contract. In either
case, the contract claims will be decided by
the terms of the contract, and the general law
of takings will have no applicability.
Many water rights takings cases also will
be decided by the court's analysis of the
plaintiff's water rights, as limited by the doctrine of reasonable and beneficial use (and in
some jurisdictions by statutory and common
law restrictions on the right to appropriate
and use water, as well). Indeed, if other

courts follow Judge Wiese's lead and apply a

133. In Tulare Lake, the court concluded that, "by limiting plaintiffs' ability to use an amount of water to which
they would otherwise be entitled, the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract
rights with regard td that water and totally displaced the
contract holder." 49 Fed. Cl. at 319. According to the
court, this "complete occupation of property-an exclusive
possession of plaintiffs' water-use rights for preservation of
the fish"-is a categorical taking. Id.

its decisions-the permanent physical occupation of real
property by (or authorized by) the government. See, e.g.,
Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (1872). On the
other hand, the decision to make additional water available for the benefit of endangered and threatened species of
fish by preventing SWP contractors from making full use of
their water supplies does resemble the action that the Supreme Court concluded was a taking in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)-the conscription of private property for public use.

Although detailed analysis goes beyond the scope of
this article, the application of a per se takings rule to water
rights cases is questionable. On the one hand, the reallocation of water from SWP contractors to endangered species uses does not at all resemble the type of action that
gave rise to the categorical rule on which the court based

categorical takings standard, the determination vel non of the property right in water will
33
be conclusive in water rights takings cases.
If the government's creation of a regulatory
water shortage infringes on the plaintiff's
water rights-i.e., if the plaintiff would have
had the right to appropriate or use water in
the absence of the regulatory limitation on
the exercise of the right-then there is a taking per se. If not, the plaintiff does not have
"private property" on which to base a takings
134
claim, and therefore the claim must fail.

134. For an analysis of the takings issues in Tulare
Lake, see Melinda Harm Benson, supra note 18, at 577-86.

